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Abstract - In mobile ad hoc networks, data transmission is tunneling, this attack imposes severe threats to ad hoc
performed within an untrusted wireless environment. Various network routing protocols. For example, in AODV, the path
kinds of attack have been identified and corresponding solutions with smallest hop count is selected. Since the malicious nodes
have been proposed. Wormhole attack is one of the serious are acting as neighbors, the AODV routing protocol would
attacks which forms a serious threat in the networks, especially get wrong hop count information and select an inappropriate
against many ad hoc wireless routing protocols and location-
.
.
based wireless security system. We identify two types of ath. Malicious nodes can also lure other nodes to send traffic
wormhole attacks. In the first type, malicious nodes do not take through them by advertising apparently short paths so as to
part in finding routes, meaning that, legitimate nodes do not launch other attacks to the data packets.
know their existence. In the second type, malicious nodes do Some mechanisms have been developed to detect
create route advertisements and legitimate nodes are aware of wormhole attacks. Hu et al. proposed in [8] to put
the existence of malicious nodes, just do not know they are . .
a
.
malicious. Some researchers have proposed detection information in apacket to restrictuthe transmission distance of
mechanisms for the first type. In this paper, we propose an the packet so as to avoid tunneling. The authors called the
efficient detection method called Delay Per Hop Indication information packet leash and they proposed two types of
(DelPHI). By observing the delays of different paths to the packet leashes: geographical leash and temporal leash. In the
receiver, the sender is able to detect both kinds of wormhole geographical leashes, the location information and loosely
attacks. This method requires neither synchronized clocks nor synchronized clocks together verify the neighbor relation. In
special hardware equipped mobile nodes. The performance of the temporal leashes, the packet transmission distance is
DelPHI is justified by simulations. calculated as the product of signal propagation time and the
Keywords - Security, Wormhole, Tunnel, Ad Hoc, Wireless speed of light.
I. INTRODUCTION There are also some other methods proposed to defense
against wormhole attacks. In [6], distributed Network
Af mobile airelessdehocnetw forlebypp arompup, Monitors were developed to monitor the control messages ofof mobile wireless devices, shas mobiela computers, the AODV routing protocol, and observe whether the
PDAs, and wireless phones, that cooperatively communicate beairvoae h crec eair atrdb h
with each other without a fixed network infrastructure [1]. It
generally uses a wireless radio communication channel. The specifications. This "correct behavior" is pre-defined in the
advantages ofMANET are rapid deployment and low cost of monitors and is manually configured.
operation. On the other hand, MANET utilizes an untrusted [10] studied how to enhance the security of routing
environment for data transmission, and therefore it is protocol in ad hoc networks. The defense mechanism simply
subjected to various kinds of security attacks [2, 3]. uses the fastest path, instead of using the path with smallest
For example, the blackhole attack refers to an attacker hop count. It can prevent wormhole attack with actual path
which dropsallthe traffic.passinwhite length longer than the false hop count produced by thewhich drops all the traffic passing through it, while wte malicious pair. However, it is not a detection mechanism.
hole attack refers to an attacker floods the network with a m
large amount of traffic. An attacker can also easily eavesdrop The mechanism developed in [11], called SECTOR,
on communication, record packets, and replay the packets in assumes each node is equipped with a special hardware that
wireless networks. Most of these attacks have been can respond to a one-bit challenge without any delay. The
extensively investigated, and the proposed solutions, such as challenger measures the round-trip-time (RTT) of the signal
the watchdog and the pathrater [5], provide encouraging with an accurate clock to calculate the distance between the
results [2-7]. nodes. The probability that an attacker can guess all bits
All the attacks mentioned above are preformed by a single correctly decreases exponentially as the number of challengesincreases.
attacker. In this paper, we focus on an attack which is
launched by a pair of collaborating attackers: wormhole In [12], similar to SECTOR, per-hop RTT is used for the
attack [8, 9, 10]. In a wormhole attack, an attacker records detection of a wormhole attack. Whenever a node receives a
packets (or bits from a packet) at one location in the network, route request message, before forwarding, it will send a
tunnels them to a second attacker in another location, and the verification message to the pervious node and wait for the
packets are replayed by the second attacker there. Since the reply. The request is forwarded only if the RTT iS approved.
contents of the packets are not modified, wormholes cannot I hsppr epeetamr fiin ehdi
be detected by cryptographic techniques. However, as these detecting wormhole attacks - Delay Per Hop Indication
two malicious nodes are acting as neighbors to other nodes, (ePIWomoeDtcinDlHIaowthsndro
hiding the fact they are in fact several hops away by
O-7803-9410-O/06/$20.OO ©2006 IEEE.
check whether there are any malicious nodes sitting along its Tunnel
paths to the receiver and trying to launch wormhole attacks. G_ _ _
We obtain the delay and the hop count information of some l1 ls 1 s 1 1 5s
disjoint paths between the sender and the receiver and use (a) Hidden Attack
this information to indicate whether a certain path among Tunnel
these disjoint paths is subjected to wormhole attacks. The (9------------ '
advantages of DelPHI are that it does not require clock |1|S| 12IM1I 13IM21 13IM21
synchronization and position information, and it does not
require the mobile nodes to be equipped with some special Tb) Exposed ack
hardware, which in turns provides higher power efficiency. Fig. 1. Two types of wormhole attacks
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We neighbors. Let's consider the situation where S wants to
first present and compare two kinds of wormhole attacks in establish a route to R. As illustrated in Fig. l(b), when MI
the next section. In Section III, we present our DelPHI receives the packet, it modifies the pervious hop field to MI
detection mechanism. The performance of DelPHI is and increases the hop count by 1. Then the RREQ packet is
evaluated by simulations in Section IV. In Section V, we tunneled to M2 and M2 performs the same setup procedure
address the message overhead issue and finally, we conclude and broadcasts the RREQ packet to R. R finds its previous
the paper in Section VI. hop is M2 with hop count equals to 3. The same thing
II. TWO KINDS OF WORMHOLE ATTACKS happens in the reverse path. When S receives the RREPpacket, it finds its pervious hop is MI with hop count equals
In a wormhole attack, two attackers work together. One to 3. And the route is setup as {S, Ml, M2, R}.
receives the packets, tunnels the packets to its partner, and In both kinds of attacks, there is at least one pair of
then the partner replays them into the network. There are two neboth are atually therectneas. Ine (a),kinds of wormhole attacks. In the first type, malicious nodes "aneghbors that are actually not direct neighbors. In Fig. 1(a),
hide the fact that they forward a packet, meaning that S and R perceive themselves s neighbors but they are not.
legitimate nodes do not know their participation in packet' We call ths kind of neighbors "false neighbors." In Flg.
forwarding. In the second type, legitimate nodes are aware of 1(b), Ml and M2 are false neighbors. Snce neighbors should
the fact that the malicious nodes are forwarding packets, just be within transmission range with each other if we are able
do not know they are malicious. For the ease of discussion, hdstance between neighbors and find that the
r rzz . z zz r *r r r ^ ~distance between two neighbors are out of range, we can tellwe refer the first type as hidden attack while the second type whether a wormhole attack occurs.
as exposed attack.
Hidden Attack - The attackers do not modify the content of Packet leashes [8] provide solution to the hidden attack
the packet and the packet header, even the packet is an based on this observation. The main idea behind packet
AODV advertisement packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the leashes is to limit the transmission distance to one hop. In the
packet from one point and replay it at another point. This first case in Fig. 1(a), S and R treat themselves as neighbor,
kind of wormhole attacks makes the sender treat the receiver but in reality, they are a few hops away, therefore wormhole
as its immediate neighbor. Suppose that S wants to establish a can be detected by packet leashes in R. However, it is not the
route to R using AODV. S would broadcast a RREQ message. case in the exposed attack in Fig. 1(b). 5 knows M is its
Any node that receives the RREQ should check whether it neighbor, and R knows M2 is its neighbor, both transmission
knows how to get to R. If not, it should continue to broadcast distances are found to be within one hop, i.e. {S, Ml} and
RREQ if it receives RREQ for the first time. It should also {M2, R}. Hence wormhole is not detected.
update the hop count information and put its identity in the Similar to packet leashes, the main idea of SECTOR [11]
packet header. However, in the hidden attack, malicious and the mechanism in [12] are to calculate the upper bound
nodes do not update the packet header as it should. As shown on the distance within one hop. Thus they also cannot provide
in Fig. l(a), the packet from S is received by MI, then MI solution to the exposed wormhole attack problem.
tunnels the packets to M2 and replays them to R, without The mechanisms proposed in [6, 10] are able to tackle bothmodifying the packet header. Since MI and M2 do not the hidden and exposed wormhole attacks. More specifically,include themselves in the header, what R will find is that the . . .
n'. . . ~~~[6] monitors the network behavior with reference to thepervious hop is S. The same observation can be obtained in
the reverse path, such that S finds R as its immediate pre-defined specifications. Since both attacks produce
neighbor, 'an th pat foni.SR hsi biul o message flows that are different from the specifications, theneighbor, d e path oud is I, RI.Thisisobviously monitors can detect them. [10] always chooses the fastestcorrect since S and R are separated by MI, M2, and other path with the reason that the paths under wormhole attacks
nodes that are in the tunnel. must not be the fastest.
Exposed Attack - In this kind of attacks, the attackers do
not modify the content Of the packet, but include themselves ofwrhl tak,teeaesilsm rwak
in the packet header following the route setup procedure..'
Other nodles are aware that the malicious nodles lie on th readng otee mehnss Fo xml, [6leuie
pat bu the wol thn ha h alcos oe redrc set of monitors to have pre-defined specification. These
monitors must be placed carefully to cover the whole network. Tunnel
On the other hand, these monitors require manual T1 I T3|M21
configuration. This is not suitable for dynamic networks. It -
also suffers from the single point of failure problem. The Q T 2 A --O- . T 4 C
mechanism in [10] also has some disadvantages. The - T3B
mechanism tries to avoid the use of the wormhole-attacked T EIIC IT141E
paths, but it is not a wormhole detection mechanism. _________ X
_________
Consider the case that some paths are congested such that the IT 12 A IT 3D
wormhole is the fastest path, wormhole is still selected. (a) DREQ roadmap
To avoid using synchronized clocks, positioning device III 3 Tunnel e R|1|T
and special hardwares, but having the ability of detecting - M212|T
both the hidden and exposed attacks, we devise DelPHI,
which will be described in detail in the following section. -----------
III. DELAY PER HOP INDICATION (DELPHI) T -
DETECTION MECHANISM ------ZV
In our DelPHI wormhole detection presented in this paper,
we collect both hop count and delay information of disjoint (b) DREP roadmap
paths and calculate the delay/hop value to serve as the Fig. 2. Two possible disjoint paths
indicator of detecting wormhole attacks, which provides a
general solution for both kinds of wormhole attacks. The but not the whole path information simply because of saving
reason behind is that under normal situation, the delay a the network resources. If the path is long, then the packet will
packet experiences in propagating one hop should be similar be large.
along each hop along the path. However, under a wormhole When the sender initiates DelPHI wormhole detection, it
attack, the delay for propagating across false neighbors broadcasts a DREQ packet to the receiver, which is illustrated
should be unreasonably high since there are in fact many in Fig. 2(a). The previous hop field is filled with the sender's
hops between them. Therefore, if we compare the delay per node ID, the hop count field is set to 1, and the timestamp
hop of a legitimate path with the delay per hop of a path that field is set with the time when the packet is sent. The
is under wormhole attack, we should find that the delay/hop previous hop field and the hop count field will be modified
of the legitimate path is smaller. Therefore, if a path has a by intermediate nodes while the timestamp field is never
distinguishable high delay/hop value, it is likely to be changed by other nodes, even the receiver. Therefore, the
subjected to a wormhole attack. sender should protect the integrity of the timestamp. This can
To avoid the need of synchronized clocks, positioning be achieved by signing the message authentication code of
device and other special hardwares, DelPHI collects the timestamp.
information and performs detection at the sender. DelPHI When an intermediate node receives a DREQ packet, it
obtains delay and hop count information in a way similar to records the previous hop field and establishes a reverse path
the AODV route setup mechanism [13]. When the detection to the sender. Then it puts its node ID into the pervious hop
is initiated, the sender broadcasts a request message to the field and increases the hop count field by 1. The resulted
receiver, and the receiver replies all the request messages DREQ packet is then broadcasted.
received. In this way, the sender can obtain the information of
some disjoint paths to the receiver. By comparing the The forwarding of DREQ is somewhat similar to the
delay/hop values among these disjoint paths, a wormhole can AODV RREQ forwarding. Any node in the network
be identified. broadcasts DREQ received and sets up a reverse path when it
receives the packet in the first time. When the same packet isThere are two phases in our mechanism. In the first phase, received at the second time, it can be simply dropped. Unlike
delay and hop count information is collected In the second the AODV route setup, a node must forward the DREQ no
phase, the sender analyzes the information obtained in the matter there is a record in its routing table or not, until the
first phase to detect whether there is any wormhole attack. packet reaches the receiver. To secure this procedure, the
A. First Phase. Data Collection sender and receiver can sign the packet such that no
intermediate node can impersonate the receiver to reply aIn this phase, the sender initiates the detection and collects DREQ message.
information. There are two kinds of messages: DelPHI
Request (DREQ) and DelPHI Reply (DREP). Similar to the When the receiver gets a DREQ, it unicasts a DREP packet
AODV RREQ and RREP packets, DREQ is used for the to the sender through the reverse path, and is illustrated in Fig.
sender to find disjoint paths to the receiver, while DREP is 2(b). It puts its node ID in the pervious hop field, sets the hop
sent from the receiver back to the sender to identify paths. count field to 1, and copies the timestamp field of the DREQ
Both DREQ and DREP packets include a pervious hop field, packet to the DREP packet. Similar to the request procedure,
hop count field, and a timestamp field. We use pervious hop an intermediate node puts its node ID into the pervious hop
field and increases the hop count field by 1 upon receiving h- DPH
the DREP packet. Every intermediate node only forwards the
DREP packet once for each corresponding DREQ. Normal Tunneled
Noted that the receiver replies to every DREQ packet Fig. 3. Relationship of normal and tunneled paths
received (compare with AODV, receiver only replies to the RTT. It can be explained by the fact that a shorter path should
first RREQ received), and each node only broadcasts the have a smaller round trip time. Hence the DPHs of normal
DREQ packet once. Hence the sender can receive a number paths should have similar values independent to h.
of DREP packets where each of them follows a path which is However, it is not the case in the paths which suffer fromdisjoint from the paths of other DREP packets. In other words, wormhole attacks. Recall that a tunnel is formed by twothe DREP packets collect information of a set of disjoint malicious nodes. No matter how long the tunnel is, the
paths from the sender to the receiver. As shown in Fig. 2(b), S malicious pair MI and M2 advertise to others that they are 1
can receive 2 DREP packets, one from MI and one from A. hop away. Therefore, the longer the tunnel, the larger the RTT,
Each DREP carries the hop count information of the path but the hop count remains the same. The resulted DPH value
that it is associated with. It also carries the timestamp of the will be larger than normal path.
time that the sender sent the corresponding DREQ. Therefore, We performed some simulations and observed that the
the round trip time of the path is the time difference between DPH values of normal paths usually appear as small valuesthe time at which the sender receives DREP and the when compared with those of tunneled paths. It can be easilytimestamp carried in DREP. Then, the sender is able to observed that the DPH values of normal and tunneled paths
calculate the delay/hop value of the corresponding path. form two separate groups as shown in Fig. 3. The difference
DREQ and DREP packets could be lost. To enhance between "the smallest DPH in the tunneled group" and "the
reliability of the information collected, the data collection largest DPH in the normal group" is always larger than the
procedure is repeated 3 times. It is possible that the hop gap between any 2 DPH values within the same group.
counts of the three DREPs received from the same neighbor Therefore, to identify a wormhole attack, we arrange the
are different. In this case, we select the delay/hop of the DPH values in descending order, and find whether there is a
shortest path for analysis. It is because a path that is under large difference between 2 adjacent values. If DPH, is larger
wormhole attack tends to be shorter. Among all the shortest than the next DPH value by a Threshold (I), then the path
path DREPs, we take the average of the delays for wormhole through node i and all other paths with DPH values larger
detection. For example, again refer to Fig. 2, that during the than DPH, are treated as under wormhole attack.
second broadcast, E receives a DREQ from C prior than D,
then the path formed becomes {S, A, B, C, E, R}, and S As our detection mechanism is based on the
receives a DREP from A with hop count set to 5. Knowing distinguishable difference of DPH values between normal
that there is a path to R through A is 4 hops away, the 5-hop paths and tunneled paths, DelPHI does not work well when
information is ignored. Similarly, if the first broadcast obtains all the paths are tunneled. How to enhance DelPHI to work
the 5-hop information while the 4-hop information is also in the situation when all the paths are attacked is left for
obtained in a later broadcast, then the 5-hop record is deleted future work.
and updated by the 4-hop data. If there are two trials of 4-hop IV PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
and one trial of 5-hop, we take the average of the two 4-hop
trials for phase 2. In this section, the performance of DelPHI is evaluated by
.. . . . ~~~~~~~~simulation using the LBNL network simulator ns [14].To distinguish the DREQs of the three different trials, we Random t lgi wth N noeswan sizelatr rndomly
have to put some identifiers in the packet headers. As there R andom generato p ide by nseSender()
are anystadarmehansmsto o tat nd s nt te fcus generated by a random generator provided by ns. Sender (S),are many standard ec isms to d ha adeis no tefcus receiver (R) and malicious pair (MI and M2) are put in the
ofthi paper, wei details to thradrsanldsb. corresponding places as shown in Fig. 4, e.g. S is randomlythe deecinndeaisinteoloiput in square A with size 1OOx1OO in the lower left hand
B. Second Phase: Data Analysis and Detection corner. In the simulation, the malicious nodes are not
Supoe.ha.teenerintite te et n i.e. necessarily to be the neighbor of the sender and receiver.Suppose that the sender initiates the detection, i.e.
'broadcasts the DREQ packet, at time ts, and receives a DREP D l
packet from a neighbor node i at time ti, then the round trip c 120
time (RTT) of the path through node i is given by RTT, = t, - 2
ts. If the hop count field in the DREP from node i is hi, then 5: random in A
the delay/hop value (DPH) of the path to the receiver through t Ml:random in A
node i is given by 2 B MR: random in (A+B)
DH RTT tiI1100{ A M2: random in (C±D)
2hi 2i 4 - L - *
In normal situation, a smaller h provides a smaller value of Fig. 4. Simulation topology
Table 1. Detection rate with different threshold (L=1000) which evaluate the performance of DelPHI in the absence of
Threshold (7) /ms Normal path /%0 Tunneled path /%0 background traffic, and study the effect of background traffic
5 98 89 on DelPHI.
3 95.6 | _93.7 _ Fig. 5 shows the simulation results when there is no
2 91.5 95.8 background traffic. We started our simulation with tunnel
1 85.8 97.6 length set to 2 hops. This is simply because 1 hop is not
Table 2 Detection rate with different threshold (L=750) regarded as a tunnel. Here, the tunnel length stands for the
Threshold (7) /ms Normal path/% Tunneled path/% hop count from MI to M2. It is found that the longer the
5 96.9 57 tunnel length, the higher the detection rate of wormhole
3 93.7 78.6 attack. And the detection rate of normal path is independent
2 90.2 86.2 to the tunnel length. This phenomenon can be explained by
1 83.8 90.5 equation 1 in Section III(B). When the path is under
wormhole attack, no matter how long the tunnel is, it always
Table 3 Detection rate with different threshold (L=500) treats it as 1 hop, hence h remains small. On the other hand, a
Threshold (7) /ms Normal path /% Tunneled path /% longer tunnel gives a larger RTT. Therefore, the longer the
5 99 10.4 tunnel, the larger the DPH, and the gap between normal path
3 96.3 30.7 and tunneled path will be more obvious. If the tunnel length
2 88.3 47.96 is small, the DPH will be similar to that of a normal path, and
1 81.9 65 it is the reason why short tunnel length leads to a low
detection rate.
We have performed a number of simulations, and due to In the case of normal path, as explained in Section 111(B),
space limitation, we only present some representative results RTT is directly proportional to h. Therefore the DPH value is
in this paper. The settings of these simulations are as follows: independent to the tunnel length, and it gives the reason why
(a) L =1000, N= 50; (b) L=750, N= 30; and (c) L=500, N the detection rate stays at the same level throughout the
15. Please note that a smaller network has a shorter tunnel. simulation.
For each setting, we generated 1000 different networks Another set of simulations were conducted with
with random node placement. In these 1000 networks, we background traffic. The background traffic was set in the
ignored those where all the paths are tunneled. We then following way: Connections are setup in randomly chosen
measured the detection rate over these remaining networks, non-overlapping node pairs, i.e. there is only one-to-one
which are more than 900 topologies for each setup. transmission, no node is a sender of more than 1 connection
We first conducted simulations with different settings and no node is a receiver of more than 1 connection.
against different threshold values (1), the results are shown in Fig. 6 presents the result when there is heavy background
Tables 1-3. Column "Normal path" refers to the percentage of traffic. We define heavy as all nodes are having connections,
normal paths (paths that are not attacked) that are detected i.e. the number of connections equals to 5000 of the number
correctly. Column "Tunneled path" is defined in a similar way. of nodes. It is found that the detection rate of tunneled path is
As expected, the smaller the threshold (1) is, the easier to much higher than that with no background traffic. And the
detect wormhole attack. However, it also leads to a higher detection rate of normal path is only slightly decreased.
rate of treating a normal path as a tunneled path if no path is
under wormhole attack. Since smaller L has a larger chance It can be explained as follows: Due to the claimed small
that the tunnel is short, the DPH values of tunneled paths and hop count through the wormhole,at traffic will choose this
normal paths become comparably close, which in turns lower path as their shortest path, which leads to heavy congestion in
the detection rate (will be explained by further simulations the tunnel. Therefore, the DPH value through the tunneled
later). In order to maintain the detection rate of normal paths path is dramatically increased. The difference between the
above 900o and that of wormhole paths should be remained as DPH of tunneled path and that of normal path becomes more
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Fig. 5. No background traffic Fig. 6. Heavy background traffic Fig. 7. Light background traffic
wormhole attack is higher. For the normal paths, since there been evaluated by conducting various simulations using the
is background traffic, the DPH value is also increased. When ns simulator. It has been shown that DelPHI can achieve
no path is under wormhole attack, a gap may appears because higher than 95% in detecting normal path and 90% in
of the delay due to background traffic. Hence, the detection detecting wormhole attack, in the absence of background
rate is slightly decreased, as shown in Fig. 6. traffic. Simulations has also shown that DelPHI can maintain
Finally, we conducted simulations with light background above 85% detection rate for both normal and tunneled paths
traffic and the result is shown in Fig. 7. In this simulation, we given that there is background traffic.
randomly choose connection pairs with the number of The message overhead of DelPHI has also been addressed
connections equals to 1000 of the number of nodes. Again, the in this paper. We compared it with AODV route setup
detection rate of wormhole is higher than that with no procedures and found that the major factor is the triple
background traffic, and the detection rate of normal path is request procedures in providing reliability. There is a tradeoff
similar to that with heavy background traffic. It can be between providing reliability of DelPHI and minimizing the
explained by the same reason in the last simulation with message overhead, and may need further investigation.
heavy background traffic. REFERENCES
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